Something that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has never understood is the economic effects of the price controls that he imposes - or if he does understand them, he ignores them. The latest incident is reported in the Miami Herald. (Click here for article)
Price controls are implemented to prevent prices from rising to market equilibriums. At prices below equilibrium, the amount that people want to purchase exceeds the amount that firms want to sell. Normally, this would cause prices to rise inducing firms to produce more and consumers to want less until the market was in balance. When prices are held below the equilibrium price by government decree, a black market is created. A shortage of the product exists and buyers bid the price up above the equilibrium price, to the black market price, where the number of buyers is equal to the production amount that is legal.
In resource markets, the price will normally be equal to the value of the marginal product (the additional amount of output from one additional unit of input multiplied by the price of the output) Efficiency requires that resources are used in the most productive way possible.
President Chavez has subsidized the cost of urea, a chemical fertilizer, in an attempt to increase food production which is subject to price controls. In neighbouring Columbia, there are no price controls on the production of coca, the plant from which cocaine is derived. As a result, the value of the marginal product of urea is higher in the Columbian coca fields than it is in the Venezuelan corn and rice fields.
Not surprisingly, Venezuelan subsidized urea is not available to the rice and corn farmers of Venezuela, but appears to be available in sufficient quantities to satisfy the demands of Columbian coca farmers. Like it or not, Sr. Chavez, markets will prevail.
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
Articles on the European Debt Crisis
One day after I post my thoughts, the newspaper articles all show up. Here are a few of interest:
From the New York Times: Speculators vs the European Central Bank.
From Deutsche Welle: Is the bailout fund large enough to save the euro?
From Reuters: Higher yields on German bonds and the arguments against joint euro zone bonds.
From Bloomberg: Bank exposure to sovereign debt and stress tests
From Bloomberg: Yield spread between US and european bank debt and the cost of credit default swaps
From the Daily Telegraph: Iceland and Ireland
From the New York Times: Speculators vs the European Central Bank.
From Deutsche Welle: Is the bailout fund large enough to save the euro?
From Reuters: Higher yields on German bonds and the arguments against joint euro zone bonds.
From Bloomberg: Bank exposure to sovereign debt and stress tests
From Bloomberg: Yield spread between US and european bank debt and the cost of credit default swaps
From the Daily Telegraph: Iceland and Ireland
Tuesday, December 7, 2010
Thoughts on the euro
Ireland looks like they will be able to pass a budget that will allow them to pay down their international debt although Irish citizens will be paying the price. Greece still appears to be in denial with protests every time a politician even thinks about raising taxes (or enforcement) or cutting government transfer payments. Portugal is hanging on … just. Spain has a 20% unemployment rate and will find it difficult, if not impossible to pass a contractionary budget. Italy? Well, same story, different language.
Portugal will be the next country to need a bailout, and Spain won’t be far behind. Of the two, Spain is much larger and a much bigger threat to European stability. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, has rejected any notion of increasing the size of the bailout fund. What happens next?
First, Portugal accepts a bailout and the bailout fund runs dry. The cost of credit default swaps on Spanish debt, and Italian debt, starts to rise. The rest of the world starts unloading debt of the weaker European countries and, afraid to reinvest in France or Germany, move the money out. This puts downward pressure on the euro. This increased supply drives bond prices down increasing yields and further exacerbating Spain and Italy’s refinancing problems. A falling euro increases the cost of imports for France and Germany which slows their economies and kindles inflation. The European central bank must raise interest rates to fight the inflation, but at the same time needs to buy up sovereign debt to prevent a run on any particular country. The quantitative easing is, itself, inflationary.
Eventually, Spain can no longer refinance their debt and must seek assistance. German taxpayers will revolt at the thought of taking on the debt of Spanish taxpayers and Spain defaults. Negotiations will occur and Spain will refinance their debt at 60-70 cents on the euro with restrictions on fiscal policy. This will mirror Iceland’s solution wherein the bondholders are forced to bear some of the loss.
Spain’s banks will be some of the larger holders of Spanish sovereign debt as a form of reserves. A devaluing of the debt will reduce the asset side of their balance sheets and lower their capital ratios. Some may become insolvent. With any luck, the banks will have purchased credit default swaps and with a little more luck, the counter parties will be solvent. Banks in other countries will also be holding Spanish debt and these banks will also have reduced assets and capital ratios.
When Spain defaults, all the world’s banks will be in jeopardy. Spanish banks are linked to German banks which are linked to English banks which are linked to US banks all through the swaps market. It is the counterparty risk that will cause the contagion.
England and the US will be able to support their banks, in a worst case scenario, by guaranteeing the debts, just as the US did in 2008. The numbers will be staggering. England and the US can do this because their central banks have the unlimited authority to print pounds and dollars respectively. Germany and France, on the other hand, have no such authority to print the euro.
There appears to be no mechanism available to force the fiscally liberal nations to abide by the deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP restrictions that they agreed to ten years ago, nor does there appear to be a mechanism to evict them from the euro currency zone. For Germany and France to save the euro, they will be required to guarantee the debt.
There is, however, a different scenario. France and Germany could voluntarily leave the euro and reinstitute the franc and mark respectively. Their debt would immediately be repriced in their own currencies. The remainder of the fiscally conservative countries could follow with the reinstatement of their own currencies. The remaining users of the euro could vote to inflate the debt away. Once the debt has shrunk to a manageable level in real terms, the euro is abandoned and so endeth the single currency experiment.
Portugal will be the next country to need a bailout, and Spain won’t be far behind. Of the two, Spain is much larger and a much bigger threat to European stability. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, has rejected any notion of increasing the size of the bailout fund. What happens next?
First, Portugal accepts a bailout and the bailout fund runs dry. The cost of credit default swaps on Spanish debt, and Italian debt, starts to rise. The rest of the world starts unloading debt of the weaker European countries and, afraid to reinvest in France or Germany, move the money out. This puts downward pressure on the euro. This increased supply drives bond prices down increasing yields and further exacerbating Spain and Italy’s refinancing problems. A falling euro increases the cost of imports for France and Germany which slows their economies and kindles inflation. The European central bank must raise interest rates to fight the inflation, but at the same time needs to buy up sovereign debt to prevent a run on any particular country. The quantitative easing is, itself, inflationary.
Eventually, Spain can no longer refinance their debt and must seek assistance. German taxpayers will revolt at the thought of taking on the debt of Spanish taxpayers and Spain defaults. Negotiations will occur and Spain will refinance their debt at 60-70 cents on the euro with restrictions on fiscal policy. This will mirror Iceland’s solution wherein the bondholders are forced to bear some of the loss.
Spain’s banks will be some of the larger holders of Spanish sovereign debt as a form of reserves. A devaluing of the debt will reduce the asset side of their balance sheets and lower their capital ratios. Some may become insolvent. With any luck, the banks will have purchased credit default swaps and with a little more luck, the counter parties will be solvent. Banks in other countries will also be holding Spanish debt and these banks will also have reduced assets and capital ratios.
When Spain defaults, all the world’s banks will be in jeopardy. Spanish banks are linked to German banks which are linked to English banks which are linked to US banks all through the swaps market. It is the counterparty risk that will cause the contagion.
England and the US will be able to support their banks, in a worst case scenario, by guaranteeing the debts, just as the US did in 2008. The numbers will be staggering. England and the US can do this because their central banks have the unlimited authority to print pounds and dollars respectively. Germany and France, on the other hand, have no such authority to print the euro.
There appears to be no mechanism available to force the fiscally liberal nations to abide by the deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP restrictions that they agreed to ten years ago, nor does there appear to be a mechanism to evict them from the euro currency zone. For Germany and France to save the euro, they will be required to guarantee the debt.
There is, however, a different scenario. France and Germany could voluntarily leave the euro and reinstitute the franc and mark respectively. Their debt would immediately be repriced in their own currencies. The remainder of the fiscally conservative countries could follow with the reinstatement of their own currencies. The remaining users of the euro could vote to inflate the debt away. Once the debt has shrunk to a manageable level in real terms, the euro is abandoned and so endeth the single currency experiment.
Monday, December 6, 2010
Peter Bissonnette, welcome to the rent-seekers' club
It's been a while since we found a suitable inductee into the rent-seekers' club. Previous invitations have gone to Heather Reisman and Dr. Antoinette Dumalo. A rent-seeker is an individual or corporation that attempts to influence government policy to generate monopoly profits for themselves.
Mr. Bissonnette is the president of Shaw Communications. He is trying to pursuade the CRTC, the regulator of Canadian broadcasting, that Netflix needs to be regulated in Canada. The argument is that Netflix does not have to incur the costs of broadcasting Canadian content and thus have an unfair advantage over broadcasters like the Shaw-owned Canwest Global. See the article in Canadian Business.
Netflix is Blockbuster or Roger's video without the bricks and mortar. Instead of going to the store to rent a movie, we can now order it online for immediate deliver. Shaw did not object to the existance of Blockbuster, why Netflix?
Our guess is that using Netflix uses up Shaw's bandwidth and that may slow their internet service. Regulating streaming video reduces Shaw's infrastructure costs. Funny that a company wants to charge for unlimited internet usage, as long as you don't use it.
Notice that Roger's has been silent on this issue since they provide both cable/internet and DVD rental.
Mr. Bissonnette is the president of Shaw Communications. He is trying to pursuade the CRTC, the regulator of Canadian broadcasting, that Netflix needs to be regulated in Canada. The argument is that Netflix does not have to incur the costs of broadcasting Canadian content and thus have an unfair advantage over broadcasters like the Shaw-owned Canwest Global. See the article in Canadian Business.
Netflix is Blockbuster or Roger's video without the bricks and mortar. Instead of going to the store to rent a movie, we can now order it online for immediate deliver. Shaw did not object to the existance of Blockbuster, why Netflix?
Our guess is that using Netflix uses up Shaw's bandwidth and that may slow their internet service. Regulating streaming video reduces Shaw's infrastructure costs. Funny that a company wants to charge for unlimited internet usage, as long as you don't use it.
Notice that Roger's has been silent on this issue since they provide both cable/internet and DVD rental.
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
More on Sovereign Debt Pricing
In a previous blog, I suggested that the pricing of sovereign debt did not accurately reflect the implications of Too Big to Fail. (Click here for blog) If my logic is correct, the appropriate investment strategy is to buy sovereign debt of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain since they overstate the default risk, and short the sovereign debt of the countries that would likely have to bail them out: Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands to be sure, England and the U.S. likely, Canada, Australia and New Zealand perhaps.
A pricing correction along the lines I suggested would increase the price of the PIIGS' debt and reduce the price of the other major nations. The bonds in play would be the 10-year maturities. T-bill prices aren't very sensitive to interest rate changes due to their short duration. 30-year bonds just aren't liquid enough.
Some 10-year bond yields courtesy of the Bloomberg app on my iPhone:
Tomorrow we look at the effect of these changes on banks' balance sheets.
A pricing correction along the lines I suggested would increase the price of the PIIGS' debt and reduce the price of the other major nations. The bonds in play would be the 10-year maturities. T-bill prices aren't very sensitive to interest rate changes due to their short duration. 30-year bonds just aren't liquid enough.
Some 10-year bond yields courtesy of the Bloomberg app on my iPhone:
Tomorrow we look at the effect of these changes on banks' balance sheets.
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
The Economics of Prostitution
An article in the Globe and Mail delves into the economics of the sex trade, particularly the government's intention to decriminalize and regulate prostitution. (Click here for article) There are so many things wrong with the government's plan that we're not sure where to start. The article's author, Professor Marina Adshade from Dalhousie University, delves on some of the more obvious points.
Any time a government institutes regulations, production costs rise. When costs rise, producers have an incentive to move away from the regulated market and into the 'black' market. This is true for all firms. We see this in the home renovation business where a large number of people work strictly for cash, without permits.
So, if I understand the government's logic, sex trade workers will be required to collect GST/HST and submit their quarterly forms. They will also be required to file income tax returns. Revenue Canada will be required to figure out just what deductions will be allowed as "legitimate business expenses". Will mandatory testing for STD's be covered by the medical system? I'm not sure I even want to know how they intend to enforce mandatory condom use. Stop a driver to check for DUI, but stop a sex act to check for a condom?
Then there is always the "lemons" problem. Sex trade workers that fail the STD test must return to the street. Asymmetric information then suggests that street workers have failed the STD test and therefore must lower their prices, increasing the willingness to accept riskier proposals.
Once again, we find that politician have completely ignored the economics of their social policies. Of course, we're getting use to it.
Any time a government institutes regulations, production costs rise. When costs rise, producers have an incentive to move away from the regulated market and into the 'black' market. This is true for all firms. We see this in the home renovation business where a large number of people work strictly for cash, without permits.
So, if I understand the government's logic, sex trade workers will be required to collect GST/HST and submit their quarterly forms. They will also be required to file income tax returns. Revenue Canada will be required to figure out just what deductions will be allowed as "legitimate business expenses". Will mandatory testing for STD's be covered by the medical system? I'm not sure I even want to know how they intend to enforce mandatory condom use. Stop a driver to check for DUI, but stop a sex act to check for a condom?
Then there is always the "lemons" problem. Sex trade workers that fail the STD test must return to the street. Asymmetric information then suggests that street workers have failed the STD test and therefore must lower their prices, increasing the willingness to accept riskier proposals.
Once again, we find that politician have completely ignored the economics of their social policies. Of course, we're getting use to it.
Thursday, November 25, 2010
“Too Big to Fail” and the pricing of sovereign debt
There is a notion amongst politicians and those with investable capital that, in the name of market stability, some corporations are “too big to fail”. The argument seems to be that the bankruptcy of very large corporations will have such large detrimental effects on the economy, that governments must bail them out when they get into financial trouble. We have seen this in Canada and the United States with the massive loans to GM and Chrysler, and in the US financial markets with the TARP bailout of AIG, Citigroup, and Bank of America. We have also witnessed the same situation in Iceland and Ireland with the bailout of the banks.
Whether or not governments should or should not bail out large corporations is a normative question and is not subject to economic debate. No government will ever possess the intestinal fortitude to try the experiment and let a company like General Motors fail.
What we are more interested in is the inefficient pricing of corporate and sovereign debt in the market. For example, Fitch Rating currently has a default rating of ‘BBB’ on AIG’s unsecured senior debt securities. This is the lowest possible rating in the investment grade category. If AIG is deemed TBTF, the appropriate credit rating should be that of the issuer that will bail them out. The US currently has a debt rating of AAA. In this scenario, AIG debt is underpriced and it’s yield too high to reflect the true probability of default. A Reuters article found on Huffington Post makes just this argument about pricing new bank debt. (Click here for article)
The problem extends to sovereign states as well. An article in the Globe and Mail makes a good case for letting the weaker European states default on their debt inflicting losses on the owners of their bonds. (Click here for article) The investors did, after all, receive higher yields to compensate them for their risk. Today, for example, the Irish 10-yr bond is trading at 633 basis points above the German 10-yr bond. If, as expected, the other euro-nations and the IMF offer Ireland the bailout that they need, the debt will be assumed by taxpayers in Germany and France. The yield on Irish and German debt should be the same as they are being paid from the same tax base. Either German bonds are overpriced (yield too low) or Irish bonds are underpriced (yield too high) or both. Ireland got into this problem by treating Irish banks as too big to fail. Now Ireland has become too big to fail. The UK, not a member of the eurozone, is in favour of the Irish bailout since a large number of investors in the Irish banks are residents of the UK. Germany and France will also commit to a bailout of Ireland, for if they don’t, panic will spread to Portugal and then Spain. An article on the Australian website The Age explains the logic of this. (Click here for article)
Markets are not efficiently pricing debt. If a company or a sovereign nation is too big to fail, and investors are not required to take a loss in the event of bankruptcy, then the debt should trade at the same price as the saviour, and the interest rate on the saviour’s debt should reflect the risk of financial bailouts.
Whether or not governments should or should not bail out large corporations is a normative question and is not subject to economic debate. No government will ever possess the intestinal fortitude to try the experiment and let a company like General Motors fail.
What we are more interested in is the inefficient pricing of corporate and sovereign debt in the market. For example, Fitch Rating currently has a default rating of ‘BBB’ on AIG’s unsecured senior debt securities. This is the lowest possible rating in the investment grade category. If AIG is deemed TBTF, the appropriate credit rating should be that of the issuer that will bail them out. The US currently has a debt rating of AAA. In this scenario, AIG debt is underpriced and it’s yield too high to reflect the true probability of default. A Reuters article found on Huffington Post makes just this argument about pricing new bank debt. (Click here for article)
The problem extends to sovereign states as well. An article in the Globe and Mail makes a good case for letting the weaker European states default on their debt inflicting losses on the owners of their bonds. (Click here for article) The investors did, after all, receive higher yields to compensate them for their risk. Today, for example, the Irish 10-yr bond is trading at 633 basis points above the German 10-yr bond. If, as expected, the other euro-nations and the IMF offer Ireland the bailout that they need, the debt will be assumed by taxpayers in Germany and France. The yield on Irish and German debt should be the same as they are being paid from the same tax base. Either German bonds are overpriced (yield too low) or Irish bonds are underpriced (yield too high) or both. Ireland got into this problem by treating Irish banks as too big to fail. Now Ireland has become too big to fail. The UK, not a member of the eurozone, is in favour of the Irish bailout since a large number of investors in the Irish banks are residents of the UK. Germany and France will also commit to a bailout of Ireland, for if they don’t, panic will spread to Portugal and then Spain. An article on the Australian website The Age explains the logic of this. (Click here for article)
Markets are not efficiently pricing debt. If a company or a sovereign nation is too big to fail, and investors are not required to take a loss in the event of bankruptcy, then the debt should trade at the same price as the saviour, and the interest rate on the saviour’s debt should reflect the risk of financial bailouts.
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